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Abstract 
This paper describes an experiment to investigate the usability of voiceprints for 
customer authentication in automated telephone banking. The usability of voiceprint 
authentication using digits (random strings and telephone numbers) and sentences 
(branded and unbranded) are compared in a controlled experiment with 204 telephone 
banking customers. Results indicate high levels of usability and customer acceptance 
for voiceprint authentication in telephone banking. Customers find voiceprint 
authentication based on digits more usable than that based on sentences, and a 
majority of participants would prefer to use digits.  
1. Introduction 
This paper describes an experiment to investigate the usability of voiceprints for 
customer authentication in automated telephone banking.  
Most financial institutions worldwide now offer some form of telephone banking to 
their customers. Such services allow customers to carry out a range of banking tasks - 
from simple balance enquiries to opening a new account - over the phone from the 
location of their choice. The hours of availability are normally considerably longer 
than branch opening hours, and in many cases are 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  
The majority of these services are at least partly automated, which means callers hear 
a series of automated messages (typically, human speech recorded by a professional 
voice talent) and are invited to respond using either their voice or the keys on their 
telephone keypad, depending on the service design.  
The level of automation varies between services. Some use automation solely for call 
routing or customer identification and verification purposes. Customers are then 
transferred to the appropriate bank staff in call centres. An increasing number of 
banks, however, now offer fully automated systems, in which customers can carry out 
simple banking tasks such as balance enquiries and funds transfers over the phone 
without the need to speak to a human agent. Access to this type of service is based on 
knowledge-based authentication (“what you know”), typically a secret password or 
PIN known only to the customer.  
Employed properly, PINs and passwords are a powerful tool in the security of 
services (O’Gorman, 2003). However, for users who have to remember multiple 
passwords and PINs across a number of applications, the cognitive burden of 
remembering each can become significant. A common solution amongst users is to 
use the same password for a number of applications (Adams and Sasse, 1999; 
Dhamija and Perrig, 2000) which has obvious security risks. Users are also known to 
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choose memorable (and therefore low security) passwords (Adams and Sasse, 1999; 
Bishop, 2005; Yan et al, 2004) and even when given careful instructions on how to 
choose a secure password a significant proportion do not comply, presumably for the 
sake of convenience (10% of students in a study by Yan et al, 2004, together with 
32% of those in the control group who were given ‘standard’ instructions).  
Studies suggest that PINs can be more difficult to remember than passwords (Sasse et 
al, 2001), and anecdotal evidence of customers using their date of birth as their PIN or 
writing it down is common. 
Increasingly, therefore, alternative or supplementary security mechanisms are being 
sought, particularly within the financial services industry where recent years have 
seen a growth in remote fraud (Hiltgen et al, 2006). ‘Two-factor’ authentication using 
physical tokens such as card readers (“what you have”) in addition to the traditional 
password/PIN are one possibility, since any potential fraudster must be in possession 
of both the relevant password and the device (Weir et al, 2009). However, for the true 
user the disadvantage is the potential inconvenience of having to have the device with 
them when they want to access the service. Moreover, the token can be physically 
mislaid or lost.  
Another possibility is the use of biometrics, a range of technologies that use a 
distinguishing physical or behavioural feature to identify or verify an individual 
within automated systems. Examples of physical features include voice (Naini et al, 
2009; Yoma et al, 2008), fingerprints (Tan and Schuckers, 2010; Yamagashi et al, 
2008) and iris patterns (Arivazhagan et al, 2009). Behavioural features include gait 
(Nandini and Ravi Kumar, 2008) and handwriting (Nanni and Lumini, 2006; Scheidat 
et al, 2009). 
Biometric traits (“who you are”) have the advantage over both knowledge and token-
based authenticators in that that they cannot be mislaid or forgotten. In addition, 
although no biometric system is 100% accurate, they are also considered difficult to 
copy or forge (Jain et al, 2006). This combination of factors has led to substantial 
interest in the technology in the financial services industry. Examples include the use 
of iris recognition at the ATM (Coventry et al, 2003a) where research found good 
usability and user acceptance, although lack of business benefits and high costs 
ultimately prevented the deployment of the technology (McClue, 2003). More 
recently, a major Australian bank adopted a voice verification system for their 
telephone banking service. In this system, once callers have completed enrolment they 
can have their identity verified by speaking their ID number and date of birth over the 
phone “without the need to remember cumbersome passwords and PINs”1.  
In a telephone banking service voiceprints are the obvious choice of biometric. 
Advantages include that there is no requirement for specialist equipment beyond the 
microphone and speaker inherently present, capture of the biometric is physically 
non-intrusive (in contrast to, for example, iris or fingerprint scans) and, moreover, the 
interaction has the potential to be highly intuitive since it is based on the familiar act 
of spoken conversation. 
The implementation of voiceprints for authentication involves two main stages: 
enrolment and verification. Enrolment is a one-off process in which speech samples 
                                                 
1
 http://www.nab.com.au/wps/wcm/connect/nab/nab/home/Personal_Finance/21/Speech+Security/?ncID=ZBA, 
last accessed March 2010 
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are collected from the (validated) user in order to create a biometric template of their 
identity. This template is then stored for subsequent comparison against during future 
verification attempts, in which speech samples are again captured ‘live’ from the user 
(although less data are required at this stage than during enrolment).  
Two types of voice verification are available; text dependent, where the user is 
required to speak a specific phrase or token during the verification process (one that 
was used during the enrolment process) or text independent, where there is no such 
restriction on the input, but achieving high accuracy is more difficult (Bimbot et al, 
2004; Reynolds, 2002). Considerably more data is required from the user to achieve 
the flexibility of text-independent verification, during both enrolment (where most 
commercial systems require around 30 seconds minimum) and verification. This can 
be tedious for users and in combination with a tendency to poorer accuracy weighs 
against use of this mode in commercial applications.  
A potential drawback of the text-dependent approach, however, is the risk of 
‘spoofing’ i.e. fraudster attack using recordings of a real customer using the system, 
either through playback or synthesis
2
. However, aside from the not inconsiderable 
difficulty of covertly recording someone using the system (e.g. concealing a 
microphone in a suitable location at a suitable time), a number of methods are now 
available which reduce the risk of this type of attack significantly. These are primarily 
based on liveness detection and include signal processing techniques, which analyse 
the spoken input for acoustic effects that indicate it is a recording. However, the 
ability to use ever more sophisticated techniques to manipulate recordings and 
disguise their source means other methods are increasingly common. One approach is 
to compare the current verification bid with N previous (accepted) bids in addition to 
the comparison with the voiceprint created during enrolment. Since some variability is 
inherent in speech, if a verification bid is found to be too perfect a match to any of the 
stored samples, the suspicion must be that this is a spoofing attack. Another form of 
liveness detection involves the use of challenge-response protocol, sometimes known 
as text-prompted mode, in which the user enrols using several different voiceprint 
tokens and may be asked for any one of these during verification, reducing the 
predictability of the interaction and therefore the risk of fraudsters being in possession 
of the correct recording (O’Gorman, 2003). Note that this method assumes the system 
employs speech recognition as well as verification software, checking that what was 
said matched what was prompted for. Some systems based on digit strings, moreover, 
increase the defence by requesting the digits used during enrolment in random 
sequences at the time of verification.  
There are therefore substantial barriers to spoofing attacks. Consequently, in a 
telephone banking context where accuracy is of prime importance, a text-dependent 
strategy is considered more appropriate than a text-independent one provided suitable 
anti-spoofing measures are put in place.  
Previous research relating to the use of voice recognition technology in the banking 
sector has tended to focus on the development of the core technology, evaluating the 
                                                 
2
 A human mimic could also be used to spoof a voiceprint but this is difficult to achieve. An 
individual’s voiceprint reflects the size and shape of their vocal tract (extending through the throat, 
mouth and nose). To make the attack viable, therefore, the mimic must have physiology that is similar 
to that of the true user. In this context, close relatives of the same gender (in particular, identical twins) 
pose a greater risk than professional fraudsters. 
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technical performance of different verification algorithms (Khan et al, 2010; Naini et 
al, 2009; Yoma et al, 2008). These studies, reflecting current biometric evaluation 
standards (ISO/IEC JTC, 2007), concentrate predominantly on false match rates 
(FMR), which measure the level of incorrect acceptance of impostors, false non-
match rates (FNMR), which measure the incorrect rejection of true users, and the 
trade-off between the two.  
There are also several examples of papers that discuss the issues surrounding 
biometric technology more generally, the pros and cons of each type (including 
voiceprints) and possible frameworks for their implementation (Coventry, 2005; 
O’Gorman, 2003; Jain et al, 2006; Venkatraman and Delpachitra, 2008). There have 
also been a number of European and UK government initiatives (BioVisioN
3
 and 
BIOSECURE
4
 and Biometrics Working Group) that have sought to promote the use 
of biometrics, including voiceprints, and which have highlighted the importance of a 
user-centred approach (BioVision, 2003). 
However, there are few studies available that provide actual empirical data on user 
reaction to voiceprint technology (or indeed the other types of biometric). This is 
important, since as O’Gorman (2003) notes, the usability of security measures is key 
for customer acceptance; if the authenticator is difficult to use it will not be used, or 
will not be used properly, which may present vulnerabilities.  
One exception is a study by Toledano et al (2006) in which the usability of 
fingerprint, voice and signature verification was measured in a controlled experiment 
with 43 users. The evaluation encompassed three different aspects of usability; 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. User satisfaction in each case was measured 
using attitude scales in Likert format (Likert, 1932; Rossi et al, 1983). This is an 
important example of an evaluation of voiceprint technology in which the reaction of 
the user was considered. However, the on-screen application employed in the 
experiment was designed solely for the purpose of comparing the different types of 
biometric. Moreover, users’ satisfaction with each technology was based in part on 
being asked to act as deliberate impostors – a non-typical experience for end-users. 
This paper describes an experiment to investigate the usability of voiceprints for 
customer authentication within the context of a real-world application, an already 
established telephone banking system. Customer perceptions of two different text-
dependent strategies for voiceprint authentication in telephone banking were 
investigated – one based on the use of Sentences as the voiceprint token and the other 
based on the use of Digits.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
dialogue design with details of the two different voiceprint authentication strategies 
that were investigated. Section 3 describes the methodology used in the research, 
Section 4 the specifics of the experiment design and Section 5 its participants. Results 
are presented in Section 6, with main conclusions given in Section 7. 
                                                 
3
 BioVisioN - roadmap to successful deployments from the user and system integrator perspective, 
January 2002- May 2003.                                                                                                        
http://www.ist-world.org/ProjectDetails.aspx?ProjectId=c73fc0f5692b4ef8a79a4e0644a0211f, last 
accessed March 2010. 
4
 Biometrics for Secure Authentication, BIOSECURE, June 2004 to September 2007.      
http://www.ist-world.org/ProjectDetails.aspx?ProjectId=83aa8f7b0a4b416fb19f61ed18ba7390 last 
accessed March 2010. 
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2. Dialogue Design 
Each of the strategies investigated was set within the context of an already established 
automated telephone banking service, that of a major UK bank. The two versions of 
the service used in the experiment were based on the live service and differed only in 
the customer identification and verification (ID&V) dialogue. Both began with a 
welcome message, followed by capture of the caller’s account number and sort code 
(either via speech or the telephone keypad). Using this design, once a valid account 
number and sort code have been given, the service can identify the customer and 
determine whether they have enrolled a voiceprint.  
Two different types of voiceprint tokens were compared in the experiment: 
 Sentences: either branded or unbranded.  
 Digits: either random digit strings or telephone numbers. 
The rationale for the choice of tokens was as follows. Commercial organisations 
considering the deployment of voiceprint authentication may be tempted to use 
branded sentences for marketing purposes. It is important, therefore, to measure any 
impact this may have on the usability and acceptance of the technology. The two 
types of digit strings were examined on the basis that random digit strings may appear 
more secure to users, but may be more difficult to use than telephone numbers (and 
therefore be less appealing overall). There may be a trade-off in this context between 
levels of perceived security and ease of use. Empirical data on both types of digit 
string is required in order to investigate this. 
In order to use voiceprint authentication in either version of the service, customers 
must first enrol a voiceprint by providing some samples of speech. During the 
enrolment call, the customer is identified and verified using existing procedures. 
Identification involves capturing the customer’s account number and sort code. 
Verification of the customer’s identity is then carried out by requesting two (randomly 
selected) digits from a 6-digit secret number previously registered by the user and 
known only to them. (“Please say or key in the Xth digit of your secret number.” 
followed in a separate stage by “...and the Yth digit.”). Once successfully verified the 
customer is asked whether they would like to enrol a voiceprint. 
On acceptance of this offer, the enrolment dialogue for Sentences involves saying 
three sentences twice each (any one of which may be requested during verification). 
For the Digits version, the enrolment dialogue depends on the type of number used. 
For random digits, as with Sentences, three different randomly generated eight-digit 
strings are repeated twice each (six utterances in total); verification may be on any 
one of these. For telephone numbers, where the verification token is fixed, slightly 
less data are required; three repetitions of the telephone number.  
A total of 24 different sentences were employed in the experiment (12 branded and 12 
unbranded). Examples of the branded sentences include “At <Bank> my voice is my 
password.” and “My <Bank> account is secured by my voiceprint.” Examples of 
unbranded sentences are “I’m using my voice as my password.” and “My voice is my 
password in telephone banking.” Participants were not given the sentences in written 
form, but were prompted for them within the service. 
The authentication dialogues using voiceprints were as follows. In each case 
authentication based on the voiceprint replaced the existing, knowledge-based method 
of two randomly selected digits from a six-digit secret number.  
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Sentences: The prompt here is “I have your voiceprint on record. In order to use 
your voiceprint please repeat the following sentence” – followed by a readout of the 
sentence to be spoken. If authentication using the sentence is not successful, the caller 
is not explicitly told so but is asked to speak a second sentence; the prompt here is 
“Thank you. Now please repeat this next sentence.”  
Digits (random digits): The caller is asked to say a randomly generated eight-digit 
phrase consisting of four digits repeated, e.g. “I have your voiceprint on record. In 
order to use your voiceprint please repeat the following string of numbers: one seven 
four eight one seven four eight.” If verification on the digit string is not successful, 
again there is no explicit mention of this; the caller is simply prompted for a second 
digit string, e.g. “Thank you. Now please repeat this next string of numbers: zero six 
nine two zero six nine two.”  
Digits (telephone number): The customer is prompted as follows: “I have your 
voiceprint on record. In order to use your voiceprint please say your telephone 
number now.” Unlike the prompts in the other versions, the prompt here does not 
state what the number is, since it is assumed that the caller will know this. (Prompting 
explicitly for a specific telephone number before the caller was verified would 
compromise the customer’s security and privacy, since it would allow anyone who 
had the account number and sort code to call the service and find out the customer’s 
telephone number.) However, if the caller repeatedly gives a wrong number, the error 
recovery prompt attempts to clarify which number is required: “In order to confirm 
your identity I need you to speak the telephone number that you used to enrol your 
voiceprint. Please say your telephone number now.” If verification on the telephone 
number is not successful, the caller is simply prompted to say the 11-digit number 
again: “Thank you. Now please say your telephone number again.”  
In each case, for authentication to be successful, the caller must both say the correct 
sentence or string of digits and have it successfully recognised, and have their 
voiceprint matched against that stored in the database. Successful verification leads to 
a variety of banking services as in the existing system e.g. account balances, recent 
transactions listings etc. If the caller has still not been verified after two utterances, 
the call is transferred to an advisor. 
3. Methodology 
The methodology employed in this research involves the use of a controlled 
experiment, in which two or more versions of the system under test, differing in some 
design characteristic, are experienced by participants. Typically, a repeated-measures 
design is employed in order to minimise the effects of between-subject variability. 
Participants experience each of the versions under test, with the order of presentation 
of the different versions balanced across the group to control for any order effects. 
This experimental approach is complemented by an emphasis on achieving as much 
realism within the experimental setting as is possible, which helps to elicit results that 
are representative of real-life use. Participants are given detailed personal data as 
fictitious personae to use during the experiment, and are presented with realistic 
scenarios in which they are asked to attempt a task with the service that is typical of 
real-life use. This involves the use of a fully functional prototype.  
Following each experience of the services, participants are asked to complete a 
usability questionnaire. The questionnaire employed in this research is a tool for 
assessing users’ attitudes towards automated telephone services which was developed 
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and tested over a number of experiments (Dutton et al., 1993; Jack et al., 1993; Love 
et al., 1992) and has been widely used and adapted since (Davidson and Jack, 2004; 
Foster et al., 1998; Larsen, 2003, 1999; Morton et al., 2004; Sturm and Boves, 2005). 
The questionnaire encompasses cognitive issues (e.g. level of concentration required 
by users, and how stressful the service was to use), the fluency and transparency of 
the system (e.g. ease of use and degree of complication), system performance (e.g. the 
efficiency of the application and users’ preferences for a human agent), and issues 
relating to the voice of the service (e.g. politeness and clarity). It consists of a set of 
20 brief proposal statements, each with a set of tick-boxes on a seven-point Likert 
scale (Likert, 1932; Rossi et al., 1983) ranging from “strongly agree” through neutral 
to “strongly disagree”. See Appendix A for a full listing. Statements in the 
questionnaire are balanced, positive and negative, to counteract the problem of 
response acquiescence set - the general tendency for respondents to agree with the 
statement offered. In order to analyse the results, responses to the questionnaire are 
converted into numerical values from 1 (most unfavourable) to 7 (most favourable) 
allowing for the polarity of the statements. Thus, for example, a ‘‘strongly agree’’ 
response to a negative statement is converted to a value of 1. On this scale, a 
(normalised) score over 4.0 represents a positive attitude; scores below 4.0 represent a 
negative attitude, with 4.0 the neutral point. Once the polarity of the results is 
normalised, each participant’s overall attitude to the service is measured by taking the 
mean of these numbers across all of the items in the questionnaire. A measure of the 
overall attitude to the service can then be obtained by averaging all the questionnaire 
results for participants who experienced that service.  
As well as providing an overall attitude rating, the mean scores for individual 
statements can also be examined to highlight any aspects of the dialogue design which 
were particularly successful or which require improvement. Finally, the results can 
also be analysed according to demographic groupings of participants (age, gender 
etc.) and any significant differences between groups can then be identified. 
At the end of the session participants take part in a structured interview, which 
provides qualitative attitude data that can be very useful in explaining why 
participants responded in the ways they did, as well as quantitative data on 
participants’ preference between variants of the design. Objective measures are also 
recorded as part of the experiment session including, for example, recognition 
accuracy and time taken to complete the task. The research methodology thus allows 
both subjective and objective data concerning the service under evaluation to be 
obtained. 
4. Experiment Design and Procedure 
Here, a mixed within-participant and between-participant experiment design was 
adopted. Each participant experienced enrolment and verification using both 
Sentences and Digits, with the order of experience of the two voiceprint types 
balanced across the cohort. Sentence and Digits type were varied between 
participants, so that approximately the same number of participants (a quarter of the 
cohort) experienced each possible combination of sentence type (branded or 
unbranded) and number type (random digits or telephone number)
5
.  
                                                 
5
 Each participant experienced either the branded or unbranded versions of the sentences in one 
version, and either random digits or use of ‘their’ telephone number in the other version. 
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Each participant was given a fictitious persona, equipped with all the details required 
to enrol a voiceprint and to use the service. Before making any calls, participants were 
given a letter from the Bank introducing the use of voiceprints and saying that the 
next time they called they would be offered the opportunity to register a voiceprint. 
Participants then made a total of eight telephone calls: four calls to each version of the 
service, with voiceprint enrolment in the first call to each version and verification by 
voiceprint in the other three calls. The task in the enrolment call was simply to enrol a 
voiceprint; in each of the other calls the task was to find out the balance of the 
account (which was varied automatically between calls). A usability questionnaire 
was completed after each of the eight calls. At the end of the session participants took 
part in a structured de-briefing interview. 
Note that although the verifier engine
6
 was running during participants’ calls, for 
reasons of experimental control its decisions were at times overridden to ensure parity 
of outcome across the cohort. In a real service using voice authentication there would 
be some failures due to rejection by the verifier, because of insufficiently close 
correspondence to the customer’s voiceprint (false non-match as described earlier). 
However, in order to set the decision thresholds appropriately extensive data capture 
is required. Well-designed systems are carefully tuned using data from real customers 
to balance the risk of false match and false non-match errors at a level appropriate to 
the application in question – typically, for example, a low false match rate being of 
prime importance in a banking system, outweighing the inconvenience of false non-
match experienced by some users as a result. This type of analysis and tuning, 
however, was not the focus of this research. Here, the outcome of the verification 
process was controlled to ensure all participants experienced both success and failure 
during the course of their calls, enabling their attitude towards each to be measured in 
a controlled manner. The system was designed such that participants experienced 
verification ‘success’ in the majority of their calls, as they would in real life. The 
exception was in participants’ final call to each version of the service, where 
verification ‘failed’ on the first attempt and a second utterance was requested from the 
user in all cases. 
Participants could also, at any stage, experience rejection or misrecognition by the 
recogniser
7
, which having already had its thresholds tuned on data from the existing 
service, was live during the experiment as it is in the real service (thus ensuring 
callers were saying the actual phrases they were prompted for). Rejection by the 
recogniser could be on the grounds of no or incorrect/incomplete input by the user, or 
could be a false rejection of a valid utterance.  
                                                 
6
 Nuance Verifier v3.0 
7
 Nuance Recognizer v8.0 
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5. Participants 
A cohort of 207 participants was recruited, from which a complete set of data were 
obtained from 204 (104 in Enfield and 100 in Nottingham, both UK). All were 
customers of the Case Bank. Three participants were unable to complete a full set of 
calls because of repeated misrecognition of digits (one in the telephone number group, 
two in the random digits group) and thus were excluded from the main analysis. 
These are discussed further in Section 6.6  
A breakdown of the final data set by age group and gender is given in Table 1.  The 
age groups chosen were designed to reflect the profile of the Bank customers 
represented in the recruitment database. The breakdown by age group and gender in 
each location was very similar. 
 
 
Age group 1 
(18-44 years) 
Age group 2 
(45+ years) 
Total 
Male 51 36 87 
Female 59 58 117 
Total 110 94 204 
Table 1: Participant Cohort by Gender and Age Group 
6. Results 
The mean usability scores obtained from the questionnaire for the enrolment and 
verification calls using each type of voiceprint are shown in Table 2. Results for both 
Sentences and Digits are shown broken down by type (branded or unbranded, random 
digit strings or telephone numbers), with each type experienced by approximately half 
of the 204 participants. Scores are also shown computed over the full set of 204 
participants (‘All Sentences’ / ‘All Digits’). Scores are on a scale from 1 (least 
favourable) to 7 (most favourable), with 4 as the neutral point.  
                                      
Voiceprint Type 
Enrolment 
Call 
Verification Calls:             
First        Second       Third 
Verification 
Mean 
Branded Sentences (N=105) 
Unbranded Sentences (N=99) 
5.24 
5.34 
5.66 
5.62 
5.69 
5.66 
5.61 
5.64 
5.65 
5.64 
All Sentences (N=204) 5.29 5.64 5.68 5.62 5.65 
Random Digits (N=103) 
Telephone Number (N=101) 
5.55 
5.86 
5.79 
5.92 
5.80 
5.96 
5.79 
5.92 
5.79 
5.93 
All Digits (N=204) 5.70 5.85 5.88 5.85 5.86 
Table 2: Mean Usability Scores by Voiceprint Type and Call Number 
Encouragingly, usability scores for both types of voiceprint were high, at above 5.0 on 
a 7-point scale. Separate statistical analyses were performed on the scores for the 
enrolment call and on the scores for the verification calls – as detailed in the 
subsections below. 
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6.1. Usability of the Enrolment Process 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied to the mean 
usability scores for the enrolment calls, with voiceprint type (Sentences or Digits) as 
the within-participants factor, and age group, gender, location, order of presentation 
of versions (Sentences first or Digits first), sentence type and digits type as between-
participants factors. This showed a very highly significant main effect of voiceprint 
type (p<0.001), with enrolment using digits found to be more usable than enrolment 
using sentences. The interactions of voiceprint type with sentence type and with digits 
type were also highly significant (p=0.004 and p<0.001 respectively): the difference 
in scores between the two types of voiceprints (in favour of Digits) was greater 
amongst participants who had branded sentences than amongst those who had 
unbranded sentences (Figure 1), and greater for participants using telephone numbers 
than for those using random digit strings (Figure 2).  
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Figure 1: Enrolment usability - interaction 
between voiceprint type and sentence type 
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Figure 2: Enrolment usability - interaction 
between voiceprint type and digits type
The original repeated measures ANOVA (on enrolment usability for both types of 
voiceprints) was rerun for each of the 20 specific attributes in the usability 
questionnaire. The main effect of voiceprint type was significant at the 0.05 level for 
17 of the 20 usability attributes; highly significant (p<0.01) for 13 of them. In each 
case enrolment using Digits was scored more highly than enrolment using Sentences. 
Particularly large differences (all of which were very highly significant; p<0.001) 
were found on some of the cognitive and fluency attributes, with enrolment using 
Sentences requiring much more concentration (Sentences 4.01, Digits 5.11) making 
customers feel more flustered (Sentences 5.00, Digits 5.63), stressed (Sentences 4.91, 
Digits 5.70) and frustrated (Sentences 5.34, Digits 5.82), and being found more 
complicated (Sentences 5.29, Digits 6.07) than enrolment using Digits. Large and 
very highly significant differences (again all at p<0.001) were also found for ease of 
use (Sentences 5.60, Digits 6.10), willingness to use the service again (Sentences 
5.41, Digits 5.92), need for improvement (Sentences 4.87, Digits 5.45) and enjoyment 
(Sentences 4.86, Digits 5.38). 
The interaction of voiceprint type and sentence type was significant (p<0.05) for eight 
attributes. In each case the pattern was similar to that found for the overall mean; 
participants who had unbranded sentences tended to give higher scores to the 
Sentences enrolment and lower scores to the Digits enrolment than those who had 
branded sentences. Similarly, the interaction of voiceprint type and digits type was 
significant (p<0.05) for 16 attributes. Participants using telephone numbers tended to 
give higher scores for Digits and lower scores for Sentences than those using random 
digits.  
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In view of the large differences in enrolment usability found between participants 
with random digits and those with telephone numbers, and (to a lesser extent) between 
those with branded and unbranded sentences, some further analysis of the mean 
usability scores was performed within the subsets of participants who were given 
particular types of digits and sentences, with the following results. 
 The main effect of voiceprint type was found to be highly significant 
(p<0.01) in both sentence type groups i.e. participants rated the usability of 
Digits enrolment more positively than that based on Sentences, regardless of 
the Sentence type they experienced.  
 In contrast, the main effect of voiceprint type (Digits>Sentences) was very 
highly significant (p<0.001) for participants who enrolled using telephone 
numbers, but not significant (p=0.154) for those using random digit strings. 
Participants who enrolled using random digit strings rated Digits enrolment 
similarly to that based on Sentences. 
 Breaking down by both sentence type and digits type, the main effect of 
voiceprint type (Digits>Sentences) was very highly significant (p<0.001) in 
both telephone number groups (i.e. those with both branded and unbranded 
sentences). It was also significant, although less so (p=0.011), in the group 
who experienced random digit strings versus branded sentences. However, 
for those who experienced random digit strings with unbranded sentences, 
there was no significant difference in usability between the two. The mean 
within-participant difference in enrolment usability (Digits – Sentences) for 
the four sub-groups was 0.94, 0.52, 0.19 and -0.02 respectively. 
In summary, the experiment showed that the enrolment process based on a telephone 
number was substantially more usable than one based on either branded or unbranded 
sentences, but enrolment using random digit strings was only slightly more usable 
than enrolment on sentences. In particular there was very little evidence of a 
difference in usability between the enrolment processes using unbranded sentences 
and random digits. 
6.2. Usability of the Service with Voice Authentication 
A repeated measures ANOVA was applied to the mean usability scores for the calls 
with voice authentication, with voiceprint type (Sentences or Digits) and call number 
(first, second or third call to this version of the service) as the within-participants 
factors. The between-participants factors included were the same as in the original 
ANOVA on the enrolment scores, i.e. age group, gender, location, order of 
presentation of versions (Sentences first or Digits first), sentence type and digits type. 
Again, the main effect of voiceprint type was found to be very highly significant 
(p<0.001), with higher scores for Digits than for Sentences. There was also a highly 
significant interaction of voiceprint type with digits type (p=0.002), which was similar 
in form to that found for the enrolment call; participants who enrolled using telephone 
numbers gave higher scores for Digits and lower scores for Sentences than those who 
used random digit strings. However, the interaction of voiceprint type with sentence 
type did not approach significance on the verification calls (p=0.738), in contrast to 
the results on the enrolment calls reported in the previous section. The difference in 
scores amongst those with branded and unbranded sentences was weaker here, in calls 
involving only one or two sentence utterances, than in the enrolment call, which 
involved saying three sentences twice each. 
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There was no main effect of call number (p=0.075), although effects of call number 
were found on a few individual attributes. On knowing what to do, there was an 
upward trend across the three calls to each version of the service, as might be 
expected in view of the participant’s increasing familiarity with the service over the 
sequence of calls – though the effect of call number was weak and was not quite 
significant at the 0.05 level overall. On control, there was a drop in scores from the 
second call (where verification was completed using just one utterance) to the third 
call (where an additional utterance was needed to complete verification). Enjoyment 
showed both a significant increase from the first to the second call (with increasing 
familiarity with the service) and a significant decrease from the second call to the 
third (where the additional utterance was required). On the whole, however, the 
results showed little difference across the sequence of calls to a given version, 
indicating little perturbation due to the ‘failed’ verification attempt in call 3. 
Analyses similar to the first ANOVA on the mean usability scores were run on the 
scores for all the individual usability attributes. The main effect of voiceprint type was 
highly significant (p<0.01 – and in most cases p<0.001) on 12 of the 20 usability 
attributes, and significant (p<0.05) on two of the remaining attributes. The results here 
on the calls with voiceprint verification were similar in some ways to those on the 
enrolment calls, described in the previous section: again scores were generally higher 
for Digits than for Sentences, and the largest and most highly significant differences 
occurred on cognitive and fluency attributes, particularly concentration, flustered, 
stress, frustration and complication, plus a few of the other attributes including need 
for improvement and enjoyment. However, the differences between the two types of 
voiceprints were generally smaller on the verification calls than on the enrolment call. 
The interaction of voiceprint type and digits type was significant (p<0.05) on eight 
attributes (concentration, flustered, stress, frustration, control, complication, ease of 
use and needs improvement). As in enrolment, participants using telephone numbers 
rated the Digits version of the service further above the Sentences version on these 
attributes than those who were using random digit strings. In the verification calls, 
however, no significant interaction of voiceprint type and sentence type was found for 
any of the attributes. Participants with branded sentences rated the difference in 
usability between Digits and Sentences similarly to those with unbranded sentences. 
In summary, on the calls with voiceprint verification the comparative usability results 
were generally similar in form to those found for enrolment. They were, however, 
weaker (particularly with regard to any differences between the branded and 
unbranded sentence groups) perhaps because the voiceprint utterances made up a 
smaller proportion of each call during verification; only one or two sentence inputs in 
the verification calls, compared to three sentences spoken twice each during the 
enrolment call. In particular a significant difference in the relative scores (Sentences 
minus Digits) was found between branded and unbranded sentences on the enrolment 
call, where there were three sentences spoken twice each in the same call, but not on 
the verification calls, where each call involved only one or two sentence inputs. 
6.3. Explicit Preference 
As part of the de-briefing interview, participants were asked which of the two 
versions of the service they preferred overall (based on all four calls to each, 
including both enrolment and verification, and prior to being given the details of how 
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the versions differed from each other). The results are presented in Table 3. The 
majority of participants stated that they preferred the Digits version of the service 
(69.1%). A binomial test, omitting the ‘no preference’ responses, showed that the 
majority preference for Digits over Sentences was very highly significant (p<0.001). 
Sentences Digits No preference 
50 (24.5%) 141 (69.1%) 13 (6.4%) 
Table 3: Votes for Most Preferred Version (N=204) 
Table 4 shows the preference votes broken down by which type of sentences (branded 
and unbranded) and which type of numbers (random digit strings or telephone 
numbers) the participant had experienced. In every participant group, a majority 
preferred Digits over Sentences, but this majority preference was stronger amongst 
participants given branded sentences than amongst those with unbranded sentences, 
and stronger in the telephone numbers group than in the group given random digit 
strings. Binomial tests within the groups (ignoring the ‘no preference’ responses) 
showed that the majority preference for each type of digits over branded sentences 
was highly significant (p<0.001), and the preference for telephone numbers over 
unbranded sentences was significant (p=0.016), but the preference for random digits 
over unbranded sentences did not attain statistical significance (p=0.144). 
  Random Digits  Telephone Number  Total 
 Pref S Pref D Nopref   Pref S Pref D Nopref  Pref S Pref D Nopref 
Branded 
 12 
(22%) 
38 
(70%) 
4     
(7%) 
 6         
(12%) 
43 
(84%) 
2   
(4%) 
 18        
(17%) 
81 
(77%) 
6    
(6%) 
Unbranded 
 18 
(37%) 
29 
(59%) 
2     
(4%) 
 14        
(28%) 
31 
(62%) 
5 
(10%) 
 32        
(32%) 
60 
(61%) 
7    
(7%) 
Total 
 30 
(29%) 
67 
(65%) 
6     
(6%) 
 20       
(20%) 
74 
(73%) 
7   
(7%) 
 50        
(25%) 
141 
(69%) 
13   
(6%) 
Table 4: Votes for Most Preferred Version by Sentence Type and Digits Type 
6.4. Ratings - Overall Quality and Security  
Participants were asked to rate the overall quality of the two versions by placing 
markers on a scale from 0 (worst) to 30 (best). They were also asked to rate on the 
same scale a service where the security procedure is that of the existing telephone 
banking service (recall of two digits from a six-digit secret number). The mean ratings 
for each of the three versions are shown in Table 5. 
Sentences Digits Secret Number (SN) 
17.5 22.9 19.7 
Table 5: Mean Ratings - Overall Quality (N=204) 
A repeated measures ANOVA was run on the quality ratings, with verification 
method (Sentences, Digits or SN) as the within-participants factor, and age group, 
gender, location, order of experience, sentence type and digits type as between-
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participants factors. The main effect of verification method was found to be very 
highly significant (p<0.001), with Digits very significantly above both Sentences and 
use of a Secret Number (pairwise least-significant difference p<0.001 in each case) 
and use of a Secret Number significantly above Sentences (p=0.013).  
Separate analysis within the telephone numbers group, and within the random digits 
group, showed that the difference in ratings between Sentences and Digits was very 
highly significant (p<0.001) in each case, with each type of digits being rated above 
sentences. The random digits version was also rated very significantly above the SN 
version (mean ratings 23.5 and 19.1; p<0.001), but the difference between telephone 
number and SN did not attain significance (mean ratings 22.2 and 20.4; p=0.115). 
Participants were then asked to rate the two voiceprint versions and the Secret 
Number version on the scale again, this time in terms of security only (Table 6). 
Sentences Digits Secret Number (SN) 
22.2 20.9 20.0 
Table 6: Mean Ratings - Security (N=204) 
Here, the mean rating for voice authentication using Sentences was slightly higher 
than for the other two methods. A repeated measures ANOVA was run on the security 
ratings, with the same factors as above. This showed a significant effect of 
verification method (p=0.031); pairwise comparisons (least-significant difference) 
yielded a significant difference between Sentences and Secret Number (p=0.012) and 
a nearly significant difference between the two voiceprint methods (p=0.056). 
Importantly, a significant interaction occurred between verification method and digits 
type (p=0.045) as illustrated in Figure 3; participants using telephone numbers (right 
hand column of data points in Figure 3) rated the Digits method as less secure than 
any of the other methods (including Secret Number) whereas participants using 
random digits (left hand column of data points in Figure 3)  rated the two voiceprint 
methods similarly and placed both above the Secret Number method. Averaged across 
the different types, therefore, the mean score for Digits was slightly lower than for 
Sentences.  
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Random Digits Telephone No
E
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 m
a
rg
in
a
l 
m
e
a
n
s
Sentences
Digits
Secret Number
 
Figure 3: Security Ratings by Verification Method and Digits Type 
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6.5. Qualitative Data 
Enrolment 
Participants were asked to comment on the voiceprint enrolment process that they 
experienced for each of the two versions. The results for the different types of 
Sentences and Digits were similar, and hence are shown combined. 
The most frequent comment concerning the Sentences enrolment process was that it 
was fine or OK (mentioned by 66 participants); 11 participants said that it was good 
or easy. Negative comments on this enrolment included that it required concentration 
or was difficult (38), that it was long-winded or laborious (38), that there was a lot to 
remember to do (18), and that the participants disliked it (11). 
For the Digits enrolment process the most frequent comment was again that it was 
fine or OK (mentioned by a larger number, 91 participants); here, 48 commented that 
it was good or easy, whilst 10 mentioned that it was quick. Negative comments (of 
which there were substantially fewer than for the Sentences version) included that it 
required concentration or was difficult (15), that the participants disliked it (10) and 
that it was long-winded or laborious (9).  
Sentences and digits as voiceprint tokens 
Participants were next asked to comment on the Sentence type they had experienced 
in the experiment (branded or unbranded) and then on the other type.  
The majority of comments about the branded sentences were that they were OK or 
fine (mentioned by 71 participants); 7 participants said that they liked them. Negative 
comments included that they were too long or long-winded (29), that the participants 
disliked them (28), that “the Bank” part of the sentence was disliked either because it 
felt like advertising for the bank or because by saying the name of the bank it could 
inform people around you which bank you use or that you are calling your bank (14), 
that the sentences were corny or silly (13), that saying the sentences was complicated 
or difficult (7), and that the sentences were not secure (6).  
The majority of comments about the unbranded sentences were that they were OK or 
fine (mentioned by a larger number, 102 participants); 6 participants said that they 
liked them, 7 that they preferred saying these than those with “the Bank” in the 
wording. Negative comments about the unbranded sentences (of which there 
substantially fewer than for the branded equivalents) included that the participants 
disliked them (20), that they were too long or long-winded (17), that they were not 
secure (11), and that the sentences were corny or silly (6).  
For each type of sentence participants were also asked if they would be happy to say 
this kind of sentence aloud when using telephone banking in private and in public. 
94.2% of participants said that they would be happy to say a branded sentence aloud 
in a private place such as in their home; however, only 27.0% would be happy to do 
so in a public place such as in their office or in a train. For unbranded sentences the 
figures were 95.1% (in private) and 41.2% (in public). 
Participants were then asked which of the two Sentence types they would prefer to use 
as a voiceprint. 63.7% of participants stated that they would prefer to use the 
unbranded sentence type; 24.0% said they would prefer the branded version (12.3% 
had no preference).  
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When asked similar questions regarding the two types of digit strings used in the 
experiment, 98.5% of participants said that they would be happy to say aloud a 
random string of digits in a private place; 65.0% would be happy to do so in public. 
For telephone numbers the figures were 95.1% (in private), but just 21.7% in a public 
setting.  
When asked which of the Digits types they would prefer to use as a voiceprint 77.0% 
of participants stated that they would prefer to use a random string of digits; just 
21.1% stated that they would prefer to use their telephone number (2.0% had no 
preference). 
Concerns about voiceprint technology 
Participants were then asked if they had any concerns about the Bank using voiceprint 
technology. A total of 55 participants (27.0%)  stated that they had no concerns. 
Participants who raised a concern commented on the reliability of the technology or 
whether it was indeed secure (39 participants), on whether someone else could copy 
your voice or if similar-sounding family members could gain access using a 
voiceprint (38), on what would happen when they had a cold or illness which affected 
their voice (20), on concerns about identity theft (16), and that the customers were 
unsure of the technology or how it works.  
Participants were also asked how they would feel about the Bank storing their 
voiceprint data in order to use it in future calls. The majority of participants stated that 
it was fine to do so (mentioned by 142 participants). Other participants commented 
that it would be fine as long as the data is secure or not shared with third parties (40). 
Some participants stated that they thought it was not secure or there was a risk of 
fraud (11) or that they would not be happy about the Bank storing their voiceprint 
data (9). 
Whilst the numbers of participants happy to have their voice data stored is 
encouraging, these results indicate the importance of explaining the technology to 
new users in order to address the identified concerns and provide reassurance.  
Use of voiceprints in real life 
Participants were asked whether they would prefer to be verified using their 
voiceprint only, some secret information only (like digits from a Secret Number), or a 
2-factor method of both voiceprint and secret information. A clear majority, 67.2% of 
participants, stated that they would prefer the 2-factor method, 25% said that they 
would prefer to be verified using just their voiceprint and 6.4% said that they would 
prefer to be verified using just the secret information (1.5% no preference).  
The most common reason given for preferring a 2-factor method of verification was 
added security (mentioned by 97 participants). Another frequently cited reason was 
that one method could be used as a backup to the other method (10).  
Participants were also asked if they would be happy to use voiceprints in real life 
when calling the Bank. 84.3% of participants said that they would be happy to use 
voiceprints. Only 9.8% said that they would not be happy using voiceprints (5.9% 
‘did not know’).  
6.6. Performance Data 
Results were obtained for both types of voiceprint with regard to the success of 
enrolment and verification calls (based on participants’ behaviour and recogniser 
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performance in each case – not, as explained earlier, on verification outcomes) and 
call timings.  
Enrolment on sentences 
Data from the 204 participants’ enrolment calls were first analysed in terms of 
participant accuracy in saying the required phrase. This was determined by comparing 
the prescribed sentence against transcription of the recorded utterance.  
Enrolment for Sentences required the customer to say three different sentences twice 
each. For branded sentences the rate of correct inputs at the first dialogue stage (first 
utterance of the first sentence) was 83.8%, and the overall average across the six 
stages was 87.0%. For unbranded sentences the figures were 81.8% and 88.3% 
respectively. As expected the highest error rate (across both types of sentence) was on 
the first utterance of the first sentence; however, there was little evidence of a 
consistent, decreasing trend across the sequence of utterances i.e. almost as many 
mistakes were made by participants in subsequent sentences as were made repeating 
the first. 
In total, just 57.8% of participants spoke their sentences correctly at the first attempt 
in all six stages of the enrolment dialogue (54.3% of those being asked to repeat 
branded sentences, 61.6% of those echoing unbranded sentences). 
Many of the incorrect utterances were, in fact, almost correct – differing from the 
intended sentence only in one short word (e.g. “I access telephone banking via my 
voiceprint” instead of “I access telephone banking using my voiceprint”), or by a 
minor substitution such as “I am” for “I’m”. Others had an error in a more important 
word, such as “voicemail” for “voiceprint”, or in a whole phrase, e.g. “I access 
telephone banking via my bankprint”. In some cases the participant stumbled and 
repeated part of the sentence, e.g. “<Bank> uses my tele- my voiceprint for telephone 
banking.” In other cases the participant apparently could not remember the sentence, 
and either broke off part-way through or made something up, e.g. “<Bank> uses my 
eh my bank details for telephone voiceprinting.” Certain sentences seemed 
particularly prone to errors: for instance the word “only” in “My voice lets only me 
access my account” was often misplaced, either before “lets” or after “me”, and there 
were various errors, from minor variants to completely forgetting the wording, on the 
sentence “<Bank> uses my voiceprint to confirm it’s me.” 
There were a very few occurrences of silence, speaking too early or DTMF input, 
which in fact has the advantage in comparison to inaccurate speech input, in that it 
will never be accepted in error by the recogniser. 
The total number of input attempts made by participants at the six stages of the 
sentence enrolment dialogue ranged from 6 (no extra attempts) up to 14 – not 
counting any inputs during failed call attempts, which occurred for a few participants 
(see the section ‘Enrolment call failures’). The majority of participants (84.3%) had 
no extra attempts, i.e. their first input was accepted at every stage – despite the fact 
that only 57.8% gave exactly correct inputs throughout the dialogue. Many of the 
inputs with minor errors, and some of those with larger errors, were accepted as valid 
by the recogniser. The average total number of input attempts per participant was 
6.33. The branded sentences gave rise to more extra attempts than the unbranded 
sentences (mean numbers of attempts 6.47 and 6.19 respectively). 
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Analysis of the transcriptions showed that the final set of accepted enrolment 
utterances was error-free for only 65.2% of participants (63.8% in the branded 
sentence group, and 66.7% in the unbranded group). The other 34.8% of participants 
consisted of 26.5% with errors in one of their three sentences, 7.8% with errors in two 
of the three, and 0.5% (i.e. one participant) with errors in all three sentences. This 
may indicate that the recogniser parameters need to be set more strictly when 
collecting enrolment utterances, so as to reject more of the utterances with errors. On 
the other hand, since many of the errors were minor, it may be that their effect on the 
speaker verification performance is acceptable for practical purposes. 
Enrolment on digits 
For Digits, the enrolment dialogue varied according to the type of number. 
Participants using telephone numbers were asked to say a single 11-digit number three 
times, whereas those using random digits went through an enrolment sequence similar 
to that for Sentences, in which three different digit strings were requested twice each.  
For random digits, the rate of correct inputs at the first dialogue stage (first utterance 
of the first digit string) was 88.3%; rates at the subsequent five stages were all above 
97%, and the overall average across the six stages was 97.2%. All of the 12 errors at 
the first stage consisted of saying the four digits only once instead of twice e.g. saying 
“five nine zero four” when prompted to say “five nine zero four, five nine zero four”, 
probably as a result of misinterpreting the prompt; in each case the participant 
corrected this at the second attempt, and there were no further errors of this type at 
any of the later dialogue stages. Almost all the correct inputs were accepted by the 
recogniser. Accordingly, the total number of extra input attempts was small, and the 
average number of attempts per participant across the six dialogue stages was 6.19. 
Only one incorrect input (actually correct except for a filled pause “eh” between 
digits) was accepted for use in creating a voiceprint, and so 102 out of 103 
participants (99.0%) had error-free enrolment data, in contrast to the figure of 65.2% 
reported above for Sentence enrolment. 
For telephone numbers, the rate of correct inputs at the first stage of enrolment (first 
utterance of the telephone number) was 99.0%; at the second stage, 100%; and at the 
third stage, 97.0%. Thus the mean correct first-attempt input rate was 98.7%. The 
small number of errors were a mixture of errors in the number itself and the format in 
which it was given. All were detected and led to reprompts, at which the participants 
gave the number successfully. One correct telephone number input was 
misrecognised, but again the number was given and recognised successfully at the 
reprompt. The average number of inputs required was 3.05, against the possible 
minimum of 3, and the accepted set of enrolment utterances was error-free for all 101 
participants (100%) in the telephone numbers group. 
Enrolment call failures  
In a small number of cases more than one attempt at the enrolment call was required. 
Four of the 204 participants failed at their first attempt at enrolment due to repeated 
rejection
8
 of their (branded) sentence utterances. One participant failed to enrol twice 
                                                 
8
 Note that ‘rejection’ here means rejected by the speech recogniser because the correct phrase was not 
recognised confidently. In this experiment there was no requirement of consistency in the speaker’s 
voice between utterances in the enrolment set, which would tend to increase the rejection rate. 
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using the telephone number dialogue as a result of giving their own number instead of 
the fictitious persona’s. All succeeded on a subsequent attempt. 
In addition to the main set of 204 participants, as mentioned earlier, three customers 
were unable to complete the experiment procedure due to repeated misrecognition of 
digits. One failed to complete enrolment using random digits due to repeated 
misrecognition of the word “six” as “two”, despite making four attempts at the call. 
Two others completed Digits enrolment but were repeatedly misrecognised during a 
subsequent verification call, thus failing to progress through the experiment and 
therefore experience the Sentences version.  
Counting these three, the failure rate on the first attempt at the enrolment dialogue 
was 4/205 = 2.0% for Sentences, and 2/207 = 1.0% for Digits. Given that one of the 
two Digits enrolment failures was due to confusion between real and fictitious 
telephone numbers, which would not occur in real life, the results might suggest that 
enrolment using Sentences is more likely to fail than enrolment using Digits; but as 
very few participants failed in either type of enrolment dialogue the evidence is very 
weak. It is worth noting, however, that as with other forms of biometric identification 
failure to enrol may be an issue for a minority of voiceprint users
9
, even with best-
case performance as employed in the reported experiment, and that appropriate 
strategies for the handling of such failures should be put in place. 
Verification calls using sentences 
Results showed that fewer participants made errors in saying the sentences during the 
verification dialogue than in the enrolment dialogue. For branded sentences the rate of 
correct inputs at the first attempt at verification was 92.4%. The average across the 
four different verification stages (three separate calls with two bids in Call 3) was 
93.2%. For unbranded sentences the figures were similar; 89.9% accuracy on first 
attempt at verification and a mean accuracy of 92.6% across all four verification 
stages. 
The errors in speaking the sentences were mostly minor, with very few instances of 
forgetting the sentence. As in the enrolment calls, many utterances with minor errors 
were accepted by the recogniser. Overall, only 1.5% of first-attempt sentence 
utterances were rejected by the recogniser (and hence required retries); in most cases 
the second attempt was accepted, and the mean total number of sentence utterances 
across the four verification dialogue stages per participant was 4.07. More extra 
attempts were required at the branded sentences (mean total 4.12 attempts) than at the 
unbranded ones (mean total 4.02). 
Verification calls using digits 
The random digit strings were also spoken a little more accurately during verification 
than during enrolment. First-attempt accuracy was 98.1%, with a mean of 98.5% 
correct first time in verification, against 88.3% and 97.2% in enrolment as reported 
earlier). For telephone numbers, in contrast, the mean error rate was higher in the 
verification process than in the enrolment call, with 97.0% correct against the 98.7% 
reported for enrolment (although first-attempt accuracy was the same at 99.0%). 
                                                 
9
 Coventry et al (2003b), for example, report an 8.5% failure to enrol rate for fingerprints at the ATM. 
(average age of user 34.6 years). Amongst older users (average age 65.7 years) a considerably higher 
figure of 33% was found (Riley et al, 2007).  
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On the random digit strings, two participants spoke the four digits only once instead 
of twice on their first encounter with the verification prompt (Call 1); the other errors 
were a mixture of DTMF input, speech-too-early, insertion of an extra digit and 
transposition of digits in the string, all leading to reprompts. A few correct utterances 
were misrecognised or rejected, also leading to reprompts, and the average total 
number of inputs required across the four verification stages was 4.14. 
Errors on the telephone number occurred in 14 calls (distributed across the four 
different verification stages) by 13 different participants. All but four of the errors 
appeared to be accidental slips in giving the correct number; the others included errors 
in the format of the number and self-corrections. Four utterances containing errors 
were accepted as correct numbers by the recogniser; the other 10 required reprompts. 
In addition, three participants had correct numbers misrecognised, leading to 
reprompts. Overall, for those using telephone numbers, the mean total number of 
utterances required was 4.13. 
Verification call failures 
For each version of the service, a large majority of participants required only one 
attempt at each of the three calls. Only one failure occurred at the verification stage in 
the main cohort of 204 participants, with one participant repeatedly transposing two 
digits of the random digit string. (When given another attempt the participant did not 
make this error.) In addition, two of the excluded participants had repeated 
verification call failures using Digits (one with random digit string, one with a 
telephone number); one because their pronunciation of the digit “oh” in the telephone 
number was persistently recognised as “four”, the other because “two” was 
misrecognised as “eight” in the random digit string. There were no failed calls due to 
problems with Sentence verification.  
Enrolment timings 
Average times for the enrolment section of the call (excluding ID&V) are shown in 
Table 7 (ignoring any unsuccessful call attempts). 
Voiceprint Type Enrolment Duration 
Branded Sentences (N=105) 108.3 
Unbranded Sentences (N=99) 97.1 
All Sentences (N=204) 102.8 
Random Digits (N=103) 105.2 
Telephone Number (N=101) 62.8 
All Digits (N=204) 84.2 
Table 7: Mean Duration (in Seconds) for Enrolment  
Enrolment based on telephone numbers took the shortest time on average. A repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied to the durations for the 
enrolment stage, with voiceprint type as the within-participants factor, and age group, 
gender, location, order of experience, sentence type and digits type as between-
participants factors. This showed a very highly significant effect of voiceprint type 
(p<0.001), with enrolment using Digits taking less time than enrolment using 
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Sentences. There were also very highly significant effects of sentence type and digits 
type (p<0.001 in each case), with branded sentences taking longer than unbranded 
sentences, and random digits taking longer than telephone numbers – all in line with 
expectations based on the differing numbers and lengths of utterances required in the 
different enrolment dialogues.  
Separate analysis on each subset of participants who had a particular combination of 
sentence type and digits type (about a quarter of the cohort in each case) showed that 
the difference in enrolment time between telephone numbers and either type of 
sentence was very highly significant (p<0.001 in each case). The difference between 
random digit strings and unbranded sentences was also highly significant (p<0.001). 
However, enrolment based on branded sentences took almost as long as using random 
digit strings. 
Verification timings 
The mean times taken to complete ID&V (ignoring any unsuccessful call attempts) in 
the three verification calls to each version of the service are shown in Table 8.   
Voiceprint Type ID&V Duration 
 Call 1 Call 2 Call 3 Mean 
Branded Sentences (N=105)  41.4  40.9  55.6  46.0 
Unbranded Sentences (N=99)  39.0  38.9  50.7  42.9 
All Sentences (N=204)  40.3  39.9  53.2  44.5 
Random Digits (N=103)  41.0  40.4  52.9  44.8 
Telephone Number (N=101)  38.3  38.5  49.4  42.1 
All Digits (N=204)  39.7  39.4  51.2  43.4 
Table 8: Mean Duration for ID&V (in Seconds) with Verification 
A repeated measures ANOVA was run on the ID&V durations, with voiceprint type 
and call number as within-participants factors, and age group, gender, location, order 
of experience (Sentences first or Digits first), sentence type and digits type as 
between-participants factors. The main effect of voiceprint type was found to be 
statistically significant (p=0.014), with Digits taking less time than Sentences. 
Sentence type also had a significant effect (p<0.01 for both the main effect and its 
interaction with voiceprint type), with branded sentences taking longer than 
unbranded ones. Digits type, too, had a significant effect (p=0.026 for the main effect 
and p<0.001 for its interaction with voiceprint type), with random digit strings taking 
longer than telephone numbers – presumably because the prompts were longer.  
Separate analysis on each subset of participants who had a particular combination of 
sentence type and digits type (about a quarter of the cohort in each case) showed that 
in the verification calls, telephone numbers were on average significantly shorter than 
sentences in the branded sentence subgroup (p=0.002), but not in this case the 
unbranded subgroup (although the mean was lower in both cases). In enrolment, the 
difference was significant in both cases. However, as in enrolment, again random 
digits and branded sentences resulted in similar durations, and verification using 
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random digits was significantly longer than that based on unbranded sentences 
(p<0.001). 
The main effect of call number was very highly significant (p<0.001), with highly 
significant pairwise differences (p<0.001) between Call 3 (which required an extra 
attempt at verification in all cases) and both the previous calls, but no significant 
difference between Call 1 and Call 2 (pairwise least-significant difference 
comparisons in each case).  
6.7. Summary of Main Results 
Table 9 summarises the key results from the experiment with regards to the overall 
comparison between Sentences and Digits. Note that in the “Significant Differences” 
column, “>” means ‘significantly better than’, and that for most of the metrics, larger 
values are better, but for duration the opposite applies. 
 Sentences Digits Significant Differences 
Usability: Enrolment  5.29 5.70 Digits > Sentences 
Usability: Verification 5.65 5.86 Digits > Sentences 
Preference Votes 24.5% 69.1% Digits > Sentences 
Quality Rating 17.5 22.9 Digits > Sentences 
Security Rating 22.2 20.9 - 
Duration: Enrolment 102.8s 84.2s Digits > Sentences 
Duration: Verification 44.5s 43.4s Digits > Sentences 
Table 9: Summary of Main Results
10
  
The results consistently show significantly better results for Digits than for Sentences. 
Voiceprint authentication based on Digits was found to be significantly more usable, 
was preferred by significantly more participants and was rated significantly higher in 
terms of overall quality than that based on Sentences. Enrolment and verification also 
took on average significantly less time when based on Digits. The only metric for 
which there the difference between Sentences and Digits was only approaching 
significance (p=0.056) was perceived security. Here, the two voiceprint types were 
rated similarly when random digits were used; telephone numbers, however, were 
perceived as less secure than Sentences. Averaged across the different types, 
therefore, the mean score for Digits was slightly lower than for Sentences.  
7. Conclusions 
Usability results from the experiment show some interesting differences between 
voiceprint types which, together with participant preferences expressed in the 
interview, can inform decisions on the use of voiceprints in a dialogue system and 
specifically a telephone banking service.  
                                                 
10
 Usability scores are reported here as sample means on a 7-point response scale. Quality and Security 
Ratings are reported here as sample means on a 30-point response scale.  
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In terms of user performance, participants’ accuracy in saying the requested phrases 
was lower for sentences than for digits, although many of the errors in saying the 
sentences were minor (and would not necessarily result in poorer speaker verification 
performance compared to digits). Both enrolment and verification took longer using 
random digits or sentences (especially the branded sentences) than using telephone 
numbers – partly because the prompts were longer (since they explicitly stated the 
sentence or digit string to be spoken, rather than simply saying “your telephone 
number”), and partly because the enrolment involved three different sentences or digit 
strings rather than only a single telephone number. However, the differences in time 
required for verification were small (three or four seconds), and the larger differences 
occurring in enrolment call duration would be less important in practice since 
enrolment is a one-off process for each customer. 
In terms of users’ attitude towards the usability of the service, data from the 
experiment consistently showed that participants found the service with telephone 
numbers the most usable, both at the enrolment stage and at the verification stage. 
Participants also found the version with random digit strings more usable than a 
version involving either branded or unbranded sentences.  
Initial preference results between the voiceprint types experienced in the experiment 
also indicated that whichever sentence type and digits type had been experienced, the 
majority preference was for Digits over Sentences, but the preferences were stronger 
in favour of telephone numbers than in favour of random digits, and stronger against 
branded sentences than against unbranded sentences – a pattern similar to that in the 
usability scores overall. 
On ratings of overall quality, the version using Digits was marked significantly above 
the version using Sentences, regardless of which type of number was used. On 
security, in contrast, there was no significant difference between sentences and 
random digits, and telephone numbers were rated as significantly less secure than 
sentences. Voiceprints based on sentences or random digits were also considered 
more secure than the current verification method (two digits from a Secret Number), 
but voiceprints based on telephone numbers were not. 
These are interesting results, especially in respect of the comparison between 
telephone numbers and the other voiceprint types. Telephone numbers were 
considered more usable than all other voiceprint types, but less secure – while the 
measure of overall quality gave intermediate results (telephone numbers marginally 
below random digits, but both digits types above sentences). 
Further preference results obtained later in the interview, when participants were 
asked to explicitly compare the two sentence and digits types, added to the picture. 
There was a strong majority preference for unbranded over branded sentences (63.7% 
against 24.0%), which is consistent with the usability and initial preference data. 
More interestingly, there was also a strong majority preference for random digits over 
a telephone number (77.0% against 21.1%). This suggests that security and privacy 
considerations (note that far fewer would be happy to say their telephone number than 
a random digit string in a public place) outweigh usability considerations in 
determining participants’ preference for voiceprint type. 
The main conclusion is that customers would be happy with the use of voiceprints 
based on random digit strings, but less happy with any of the other types of 
voiceprints considered here. Sentences were rated as less usable than digit strings, and 
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came out below them in the preference votes. Telephone numbers, though highly 
usable, were much less acceptable in respect of security and privacy. 
A second conclusion is that customers acknowledge the need for security, possibly 
even at the expense of convenience when it comes to verification methods for 
telephone banking. This is shown in the sizeable majority of participants (67.2%) 
expressing a preference for 2-factor verification (voiceprint plus secret information) 
over the use of either a voiceprint or secret information alone. However, since 
participants did not directly experience a 2-factor process in this research, to 
investigate this further a second experiment was carried out in which the use of 
voiceprints (based on digits) was compared in both a 2-factor and single factor 
approach. Results of this experiment are currently in preparation for publication. 
On a more general level, results from the experiment are encouraging in that they 
indicate customers are happy to accept voiceprint technology for telephone banking in 
real life (84.3% said they would be happy to do so). Usability scores for both types of 
voiceprint, although significantly different, were high at above 5.0 on a 7-point scale. 
Moreover, privacy concerns relating to the storage of their voice data, often cited as a 
potential issue in the deployment of biometric technology, do not appear to be a 
barrier in this context (69.6% said they had no concerns at all, a further 19.6% said 
they had no concerns provided the data were not shared with any third parties). These 
data provide quantitative support for the view that users are “more open to the concept 
[of biometrics] where there is clear security need in their personal life e.g. banking” 
(Sasse, 2004). Interview results highlighted the importance of explaining the 
technology to new users, and indeed the (positive) results reported here may have 
been coloured by participants’ lack of knowledge and expertise on the subject. 
Conclusions from the experiment are, of course, based on customers’ experience of 
one particular form of enrolment and verification dialogue for each voiceprint type 
(designed to reflect realistic possible uses of the technology in the live service). It 
would be difficult to investigate the full range of design possibilities in a single 
experiment, but it is worth bearing this factor in mind when interpreting the results. It 
is possible, for example, that the preference for digits may be reduced in a scenario 
where more extended enrolment is used to allow increased protection against spoofing 
(e.g. repetition of all the digits from zero to nine), although longer enrolment was not 
found to be a determining factor in the existing experiment. (Moreover, it could be 
argued that if this were the objective, enrolment with the other voiceprint types would 
also have to be altered and extended.)   
Additional errors due to verification failure (false non-match) may also impact the 
results since the level of errors may vary for the different voiceprint types. In fact, 
while the amount of speech data collected in this experiment was not sufficient for a 
definitive comparison of verification error rates, some offline tests were run on the 
utterances from the experiment, and these yielded equal error rates
11
 on sentences 
(branded 0.95%, unbranded 0.86%) that were intermediate between those for 
                                                 
11
 The Equal Error Rate (EER) is the percentage rate of false matches or false non matches obtained 
when the verifier’s decision threshold is set so that these two percentages are equal.  The false 
acceptance rates for this purpose were computed using all speakers of the same sex as the target 
speaker who had spoken the same number or sentence during the experiment.  It must be emphasised 
that the number of speakers here (approximately 100 for each voiceprint type) was not sufficient to 
provide an accurate measure of verification performance, and therefore the stated error rates are only 
order-of-magnitude estimates. 
 25 
telephone numbers (0.33%) and random digit strings (1.34%) - low in each case. 
Allowing multiple attempts at verification, as in the experiment, would further reduce 
the rate of false non-matches, with attitude results suggesting that users were not 
perturbed by a ‘failed’ verification attempt in their third call to the service (although 
they were not explicitly told the reason for the retry). This experiment did not 
examine the situation in which a caller repeatedly experiences a false non-match and 
is passed to an agent as a result. Although likely to be relatively rare, it is likely that 
this will have considerable impact on the individual user’s attitude towards the 
technology and requires sensitive handling on the part of the Bank. 
These qualifications aside, this research represents a detailed evaluation of voiceprint 
technology from a user perspective that is rarely evident in other research in this area, 
or indeed the field of biometrics in general (Toledano et al, 2006). Moreover, its 
setting within the context of an already established telephone banking system 
strengthens understanding of how voiceprints can be used in real-life scenarios and 
provides practitioners considering use of the technology with valuable empirical data 
on which to base their design decisions.  
Further research work being considered in this field as suggested by these results, 
includes a investigation of user perceptions of voiceprints technology on the basis of a 
more prolonged exposure to the technology in a longitudinal study; investigation of 
the role of text-independent voiceprint technology (in contrast to the text-dependent 
approach reported here): and a study of the impact of real world usage environments 
on technology performance and user perceptions - as opposed to the laboratory setting 
used to derive the results reported here.  
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Appendix A. Items in Usability Questionnaire 
Statements were presented in a randomised order for each participant.  
Q1   I thought the service was too complicated. 
Q2   When I was using the service I always knew what I was expected to do. 
Q3   I thought the service was efficient. 
Q4   I liked the voice. 
Q5   I would be happy to use the service again. 
Q6   I found the service confusing to use. 
Q7   The service was friendly. 
Q8   I felt under stress when using the service.  
Q9   The service was too fast for me. 
Q10  I thought the service was polite. 
Q11  I found the service frustrating to use. 
Q12  I enjoyed using the service. 
Q13  I felt flustered when using the service. 
Q14  I think the service needs a lot of improvement. 
Q15  I felt the service was easy to use. 
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Q16  I would prefer to talk to a human being. 
Q17  I thought the voice was very clear. 
Q18  I felt that the service was reliable. 
Q19  I had to concentrate hard to use the service. 
Q20  I did not feel in control when using the service. 
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